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Empirical studies of online reviews have found that valence (average rating) has a 
consistently positive impact on consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP), but volume does not. 
Although two studies tried to explain this phenomenon using different perspectives (Wu and 
Ayala, 2012; Sun, 2012), neither study can fully accommodate the consumer behaviors observed 
by the other. This dissertation adopts a theoretical framework that can explain the consumer 
behaviors observed in both studies as well as the varying influence of review volume at the 
individual level. Specifically, several studies were conducted to investigate the relationship 
between bidirectional online seller reviews (e.g., the eBay review format) and consumers’ WTP. 
Essay 1 provides an extensive review of studies that investigate online consumer reviews 
at the market, product, firm, consumer, and message level; special attention is given to the 
outcomes of consumer reviews for both products and sellers. In addition, this essay establishes 
the importance of the current research topic. 
Essay 2 combines economic and behavioral theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty to develop a theoretical framework. The framework proposes that review volume and 
valence influence a consumer’s WTP through a weighting function of outcome probability. 
Consumers with different preferences towards uncertainty will have different preferences toward 
review volume, and for some consumers, such preference can change depending on the review 
valence. Based on this conceptualization, the framework reconciles the current literature by 
explaining the inconsistent influence of review volume both across and within individuals. The 
internal validity of the framework is tested with an experiment and analyses carried out at the 
individual level provide strong support for the proposed conceptual model. 
Essay 3 establishes the relevance of this research for managers by applying the 
framework to real market data. Due to the nature of the transactional data, a finite mixture model 
x 
 
is used to estimate the weighting function, and hypotheses are tested at the group instead of the 
individual level. A simulation study demonstrates the validity of using a finite mixture model to 
estimate the weighting function and classify groups. The results of the hypotheses testing provide 




ESSAY ONE. AN APPRAISAL OF ONLINE USER REVIEWS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
By nature, online purchases involve much more uncertainty than offline purchases. 
Online reviews, a digital form of consumer word-of-mouth, provide a useful tool for reducing the 
uncertainty of purchases. Ample evidence shows that online reviews have become an important 
component of consumers’ purchase decisions. Nielsen’s 2010 online shopping report reveals that 
online reviews and peer recommendations have become a key factor that influences consumers’ 
purchases, especially those of electronics, cars, and travel. Forty percent (40%) of online 
consumers indicate that they will not buy electronics without reading online reviews first. In 
Nielsen’s more recent report on advertising trustworthiness (2012), online consumer opinions is 
ranked as the second-most trustworthy and second-most relevant form of advertising when 
searching for information about products, trailing only recommendations from the consumer's 
personal network. Academic studies also confirm the importance of online reviews. For example, 
Bronner and de Hoog (2010) found that tourists rated consumer-generated review sites as more 
up-to-date and useful than market-generated sites (2010). Utz at al. (2012) found that consumer 
reviews of an online retailer are a more important indicator of trustworthiness than the overall 
store reputation. 
In contrast to traditional word-of-mouth, online reviews can be massive in scale. The 
assessment of a product or seller is no longer limited to one or two customers’ experiences; those 
assessments may come from hundreds, thousands, or even millions of customers. On the other 
hand, in offline word-of-mouth communication, a consumer typically knows the communicator 
and is able to judge the quality of the assessment based on that knowledge. Such personal 
knowledge about online communicators is generally missing. Because of these unique 
characteristics, online reviews have drawn a great deal of attention from researchers. Despite the 
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huge efforts that are devoted to this topic, we still lack a deep understanding of the mechanisms 
that tie online reviews to consumer decisions, product or firm performance, and market 
efficiency. My research goal is to explore how online reviews influence consumer’s price 
decisions and provide insights for managers to better utilize online reviews to increase their 
firms’ marketing performance. To reach this goal, I conducted an extensive literature review to 
ascertain current knowledge about online reviews. 
 
Method 
The scope of this review is limited to consumer-generated online reviews about products, 
individual sellers, and firms. The purpose of my research is to study the impact of massive 
consumer reviews on consumer decisions, so I exclude research (1) that focuses on consumer-
generated content in the form of blogs or social network platforms, because the impact of social 
ties is not relevant to the current research, and (2) that examines objective third-party reviews, 
such as reviews from consumer reports or professional organizations. 
Following the call for multi-disciplinary research on e-commerce (Taylor and Strutton, 
2010), I reviewed research in the following disciplines: marketing, management, information 
science, and economics. I selected the top 20 journals ranked by ISI impact factor and the top 20 
journals ranked by ISI 5-year impact factor in the categories of business, management, 
information science & library science, and economics. The final list included 57 journals, each of 
which I reviewed from 2000 to the present. The list of journals is shown in the appendix. 
In the rest of Essay One, I summarize the current literature and explain my research 
motivations. First, I briefly review the areas of research that involve online consumer reviews; 
second, I provide a more detailed review of the outcomes of consumer reviews, for both products 
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and sellers/firms; last, I discuss the studies that motivate my research topic and the structure of 
my dissertation. 
 
ONLINE USER REVIEWS 
Websites commonly use two types of review systems. The first is a star rating system, by 
which a consumer can rate a seller or a product using a Likert scale; for example, Amazon uses a 
5-star review system, with 1 being the lowest value and 5 being the highest. The second is a 
bidirectional review system that assumes that a consumer will provide a positive review if 
satisfied and a negative one if not, such as eBay’s review system. Most review systems provide 
statistical summaries of the reviews: review volume is the number of reviews received for a 
specific seller or product and review valence is the average of the review ratings. Even though 
many systems do not directly report the variance of reviews, it can be inferred by the consumers 
in various ways, for example, by looking at the distribution of reviews. Examples of these two 
review systems are shown in Figures 1.1. 
In the following review, I organize the research based on focus and topic. Studies of 
online reviews have very different emphases and scopes. Some studies focus on market-level 
outcomes, such as the characteristics of review distributions in various markets and the 
effectiveness of employing review systems to improve market efficiency. Some studies focus on 
the product/firm level, exploring the generation and consequence of reviews for a specific 
product or seller. Some research looks closely at the consumer or message level, studying what 









One stream of literature provides insights on the design of review systems. Through 
modeling, experiments, and online empirical studies, these studies identify the conditions under 
which review systems are useful for generating efficient economic outcomes. Bakos and 
Dellarocas (2011) utilize game theory to demonstrate that an online reputation system is very 
important for a market in which adverse selection exists; a reputation-based system helps sellers 
and buyers learn about each other, benefitting both participants with high quality. They also 
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suggest that reputation systems are very important for the professional services market, where 
other endurance mechanisms may cost a lot and the service outcome depends more on the type of 
rather than the effort by the seller. Introducing review systems can improve buyers’ well-being 
and their willingness to trade in that market (Yang et al., 2007), and the larger the impact of the 
review system on the transaction outcomes (rewards for positive reviews and punishments for 
negative reviews), the more likely the sellers will be honest (Zhou et al., 2008). Within a 
repeated-game setting, Yang et al. (2007) conclude that the mere existence of a review system, 
no matter how simple, helps improve market performance. Dellarocas (2005) also find that a 
simple binary review profile, such as eBay’s review mechanism, can stimulate maximum market 
efficiency. Kumar and Benbasat (2006) argue that allowing a consumer to provide a review not 
only improves the consumer's perception of the website functionality, but also strengthens the 
social connection between the website and the consumer. 
Even though review systems can enhance market-level honesty, dishonest behavior can 
still exist. Yang et al. (2007) demonstrate that there is a correlation between a seller’s tendency 
to cheat and her reputation; that is, the more the seller tends to cheat, the more likely she will 
build a good reputation. Moreover, dishonest sellers can manipulate reviews at a relatively low 
cost. Since reviews are anonymous, dishonest sellers can submit good reviews for themselves, 
and bad sellers can still participate in the market by starting over with a new ID. Some studies 
have identified the conditions that enhance or limit the effectiveness of a review system in 
promoting seller honesty. Zhou et al. (2008) find that the effectiveness of review systems can be 
limited if buyers are not motivated to review sellers after transactions. Aperjis and Johari (2010) 
examine the number of past transactions that should be used to calculate a seller’s reputation. 
They find that calculating the seller's reputation over a longer duration of time and a larger 
number of transactions is more likely to make patient sellers truthful but less likely to make high-
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quality sellers truthful. Finally, Bolton et al. (2008) suggest that encouraging market-level 
competition can increase the effectiveness of a review system by building trust, and 
trustworthiness, in the market. 
To specifically deal with fraud in review systems, Abbasi et al. (2008) propose a 
stylometric method for identifying a trader by analyzing he writing style of the feedback 
comments she posts. You et al. (2011) also propose a set of indicators that can detect fake 
transactions and puppet buyers on consumer-to-consumer auction sites. By comparing regular 
and collusive transactions on a large Chinese auction site, they find that buyers for collusive 
transactions are usually more active and have a shorter history than regular buyers, collusive 
transaction items are on average less valuable than regular transaction items, and puppet buyers 
are more likely to present detailed comments for collusive sellers. 
 
Product- and Firm-Level Research 
Research at the product/firm level has focused on four areas: (1) antecedences of reviews, 
(2) changes of review structure overtime, (3) outcomes of reviews, and (4) marketing strategies 
that incorporate online reviews. I do not summarize review outcomes in this section, providing a 
more detailed discussion later in the essay. 
Antecedences of reviews. Studies have identified factors that influence the volume and 
the valence of product reviews. 
Factors that influence review volume. One stream of literature explores the factors that 
may influence the generation of online reviews, which has been shown to be associated with 
market factors such as popularity (Dellarocas et al., 2010) and sales (Moe and Trusov, 2011; 
Dellarocas et al., 2010; Feng and Papatla, 2011), firms’ strategies such as advertising spending 
(Feng and Papatla, 2011), and existing reviews for the product (Moe and Trusov, 2011, 
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Dellarocas et al., 2010).The most intuitive factor that influences the propensity of reviews is 
sales, since the greater the product sales, the more experience consumers have with the product, 
and the more likely they are to post reviews for that product (Moe and Trusov, 2011; Feng and 
Papatla, 2011). Examining market-level data, Dellarocas et al. (2010) find that consumers prefer 
to post reviews for movies that are less popular and less successful; they also like to post reviews 
for movies that have already accumulated many comments. Correspondingly, the authors 
observe a U-shaped relationship between review posting volume and a movie’s box office 
revenue, in which more reviews are posted for either very obscure movies or high box-revenue 
movies. Feng and Papatla (2011) find that the amount spent on advertising for an automobile 
brand is negatively associated with the number of reviews posted in the same year. Comparing 
two data sets collected in 2001 and 2008, respectively, Chen et al. (2011) find that, in general, 
there are more reviews posted for products of extremely low or extremely high quality. During 
the early stages of internet use, the price of a product negatively influences the aptness of 
reviews for that product. As internet use becomes more common among consumers, price 
exhibits a U-shaped relationship with review volume: more reviews are observed for products 
that either have extremely low or extremely high prices. 
Factors that influence review valence. Li and Hitt (2010) propose that consumer reviews 
should reflect their evaluation of not only product quality but also product value. In a study of 
reviews for cameras, they find that, when controlled for camera quality, the average of review 
ratings will rise by 0.16 (on a 1-10 scale) if the camera price drops by 20% and 0.36 if the price 
drops by 40%.In a study of automobile reviews, Chen et al. (2011)find that, although price has a 
negative but statistically insignificant influence on review ratings, it has a U-shaped relationship 
with review valence in the early stages of internet usage, in which lower or higher priced 
products tend to have higher ratings than moderately priced products. For experiential products, 
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review valence is found to be positively related to the number of product users (Yang and Mei, 
2010).Koh et al. (2010) study the influence of culture on online review valence. In a review of 
ratings for movies by consumers from China, Singapore, and the U.S., they find that Chinese 
consumers are less likely than American consumers to provide extreme ratings. Correspondingly, 
they observe a U-shaped distribution of review valence on American movie review sites, but a 
bell-shaped distribution of review valence on Chinese movie review sites. 
Review evolvement. Studies also examine review evolvement, most of them using 
longitudinal data to capture the progression of review profiles over time. Li and Hitt (2008) 
attribute the changes in product reviews over time, which usually follow a falling trend, to the 
fact that early reviewers, who are also initial buyers of a product, self-select the products they 
believe they are more likely to enjoy, and hence their evaluations tend to be more positive. The 
opinions of earlier buyers, however, do not necessarily reflect those of later buyers. Li and Hitt 
also find that when consumers use product reviews to form purchase decisions, they do not fully 
correct the self-selection bias. As a result, later buyers’ reviews tend to be lower than early 
buyers', and the majority of the reviews follow a declining trend over time. 
Moe and Trusov (2011) find that increases in review valence tend to incite new negative 
reviews and discourage the subsequent posting of extremely positive reviews; increases in 
variance among existing reviews discourage the posting of extreme reviews; and an increase in 
review volume increases the posting of reviews in general. Using book review data from 
Amazon and controlling for book quality, Hu and Li (2011) find that later reviews for a book 
tend to deviate from previous reviews. That deviation is more likely if the later reviews mention 
the earlier reviews, the existing reviews have a large volume or a small variance, and the book is 
not popular among consumers. 
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Firm’s marketing strategy. Given the overwhelming evidence that online reviews 
contain valuable information for consumers as well as companies, studies propose various ways 
that companies can incorporate online product reviews into their marketing strategies. Chen and 
Xie (2008) develop a normative model to show that firms should incorporate consumer reviews 
when developing their communication strategies. Companies’ responses to online consumer 
reviews should take into consideration the relative size of the expert consumer segment and the 
cost of the product. Companies should release more product attribute information in response to 
consumer reviews if the product cost is low or the expert consumer segment is large, but reduce 
the amount of information if the product cost is high or there are not enough expert consumers. 
Chen and Xie (2008) also suggest that companies should be cautious about providing consumers 
the option to leave reviews on their websites. Such a feature benefits products when the novice 
consumer segment is large, but can hurt the company when the expert consumer segment is 
large. Several studies also propose marketing research methods or models that retrieve 
information from online consumer reviews to provide insights for companies’ positioning (Lee 
and Bradlow, 2011) and product strategies (Decker and Trusov, 2010). 
 
Consumer- and Message-Level Research 
Studies that focus on the consumer level explore individual characteristics that lead to 
different behaviors in terms of posting and using online reviews. Many researchers also look at 
individual review messages and identify qualities that make one message more persuasive than 
another. 
Loyalty to review systems. Wang et al. (2010) find that people tend to continuously use 
an online review system if they have a high propensity to learn about and adopt online review 
systems, and if they view review systems as very relevant to their personal needs and interests. In 
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a survey of online users, Awad and Ragowsky (2008) find that gender plays a role in the 
perception of the quality of a review system and of trust towards a website. Men view a review 
system as having better quality if it provides many opportunities for the consumer to post 
opinions, if there is a high volume of responses, and if others participate. For women, the 
response from and participation of others is very important, but the opportunity to post opinions 
is negatively associated the quality of the review system. For men and women, the helpfulness 
and ease of use of a review system positively influences their trust of the website and hence their 
intention to use it, but women place more weight on ease than men. Park and Lee (2009) propose 
that a consumer will use online reviews more and be more likely to be influenced by them if she 
is more susceptible to interpersonal influence and has more online shopping experience. They 
also find that the relationship between these personal characteristics and online review usage 
behavior is stronger for Korean consumers than for U.S. consumers. 
Review posting behavior. Additional studies explore what types of consumers are more 
likely to post reviews. Usually posting behavior is associated with a consumer's personal 
characteristics and experience with the purchase. Many studies have documented that consumers 
who have the highest and lowest satisfaction levels are more likely to post reviews, which leads 
to an under-reporting bias (Koh et al., 2010). 
Henning-Thurau et al. (2009) closely examine the underlying motives of consumers who 
post opinions. In an analysis of comments posted on a German opinion website, they find that 
concern for other customers, the social benefit of affiliating with a virtual community, a desire 
for positive recognition from others, the economic rewards from website operators, and a need 
for advice are the dominant motives. These motives are associated with the frequency of a 
consumer’s visits to the website and the number of comments she wrote. They also suggest that 
firms can segment consumers based on their motives for posting opinions online. 
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Review adoption. Using a simulation of an online auction site, Wolf and Muhanna 
(2011) find that consumers usually focus on review valence information and underweight review 
volume. Moreover, they find that this bias is more prevalent for the star-scale review format, 
such as Amazon’s, than for the binary review format, such as eBay's. Some studies suggest that 
different consumers will process review information differently. For example, Lee et al. (2008) 
find that high-involvement consumers tend to be influenced by negative reviews that have high 
quality; however, low-involvement consumers tend to conform to negative reviews regardless of 
review quality. Park and Kim (2008) propose that experts like to process information about 
product attributes and infer the benefit based on their knowledge, but novices like to process 
information that directly discloses product benefits. Hence, reviews focusing on product 
attributes have more impact on experts’ purchase intentions, while comments focusing on 
product benefits have more impact on novices’ purchase intentions. 
Review message persuasiveness. As mentioned above, consumers provide reviews of 
products and sellers for various reasons; their backgrounds also vary widely in terms of interest 
and knowledge. Therefore, readers do not perceive reviews as equal in quality or credibility. 
Many studies show that consumers do read more than the statistical summary of the review 
profile; they also will read individual reviews and heed the authors. DeMaeyer and Estelami 
(2011) document that consumers trust experts’ opinions more for goods, but users’ testimonials 
more for services. Naylor et al. (2011) argue that consumers’ perceptions of the similarities 
between themselves and the reviewers will impact how much they are persuaded by the reviews. 
When information about a reviewer is missing, readers will infer that the ambiguous reviewer is 
similar to them; hence, consumers tend to agree with reviews posted by ambiguous reviewers 
more than with reviews posted by dissimilar reviewers. Lee et al. (2008) find that the influence 
of negative product reviews on consumers’ attitudes towards a product is moderated by the 
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quality of the review, as measured by relevancy, reliability, understandability, and sufficiency. 
Kim and Gupta (2011) study the emotional expression in review messages, and find that 
consumers tend to attribute negative emotions to a reviewer’s irrational dispositions; therefore, 
the expression of negative emotions in a negative review decreases its persuasiveness. However, 
the expression of positive emotion in a positive review does not improve the consumer’s 
evaluation of the target. 
Consumers do not just care about the review content for product information; they also 
care about the content of reviews for online sellers. Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) conducted a 
large-scale content analysis of reviews posted on eBay, finding that the review text generated 
significant economic value beyond the numerical ratings. After controlling for a seller’s 
numerical ratings, they find that reviews that comment on a seller’s outstanding/abysmal 
benevolence and outstanding/abysmal credibility will influence consumers’ trust of the seller 
and, as a result, impact the price premiums charged by the seller. 
Some studies suggest that consumers may choose to trust and rely on only parts of a 
review. Yang and Mei (2010) find that for experiential products such as video games, consumers 
tend to trust comments about search attributes but not high-level experiential attributes. Finch 
(2007) finds that on eBay, reviews about the quality of a seller’s services such as delivery, 
communication, and problem solving are very important for low-risk products, or new products 
of low value. However, reviews about the quality of the product, such as its condition, and 
whether the product is exactly as described by the seller are very important when there high risks 
associated with the product, for example, used products or high-priced products. 
Websites like Amazon.com and Epinions.com also provide rating systems for the review 
itself. Amazon.com lets consumers indicate whether they feel a review is helpful or not, and 
consumers can also comment on reviews provided by others. Epininons.com, a website that 
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allows consumers to review various products, uses two ratings to help consumers identify high-
quality reviews. The first rating assesses the content of the review: a consumer can rate each 
review as not helpful, somewhat helpful, helpful, or very helpful. The second rating assesses the 
source of the review. Each reviewer has a profile that lists all of the reviews she has provided, 
and a consumer can choose to “trust” the reviewer or “block” the reviewer. Studies also analyze 
the content of reviews to determine what types of reviews score highest on the helpfulness rating. 
Message content, such as one-sided vs. two-sided argument and evidence presentation, and 
written style, such as readability, comprehensiveness, and language intensity, are found to be 
associated with the helpfulness ratings of reviews (Korfiatis et al., 2011; Li and Zhan, 2012). 
Mudambi and Schuff (2010) also propose that while the extremity of a review and the depth of a 
review influence the helpfulness rating, these relationships are moderated by whether the target 
product is a search or experience product. 
 
ONLINE USER REVIEWS AND THE OUTCOMES 
In this section, I discuss the outcomes of online consumer reviews in detail. Reviews can 
be written about products or sellers/firms. Research shows that product reviews usually provide 
information about product attributes, functionality, and benefits (Park and Kim, 2008); seller 
reviews usually disclose information about product quality, such as product conditions, as well 
as seller quality, such as delivery and communication (Lei, 2011). The studies discussed in this 
section focus on product- or firm-level review characteristics and outcomes. Specifically, many 
studies investigate statistical summaries of reviews, such as review volume, valence, and 
variance. Most of the studies explore the influence of online reviews on aggregate consumer 
behavioral outcomes, for example, product sales (Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Chevalier and 
Mayzlin, 2006; Li and Hitt, 2008; Chen et al., 2011), sales price (Melnik and Alm, 2002; Zhang, 
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2006; Reiley et al., 2007; Wu and Ayala, 2012), product revenue (Basuroy et al., 2003; Liu, 
2006; Duan et al., 2008; Moon et al., 2010), and firm's financial performance (Chen et al., 2012; 
Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012). A few studies investigate the influence of online reviews on 
consumer attitudinal outcomes such as preference (Lee and Lee, 2009; Khare et al., 2011) and 
trust (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). I summarize the studies on product reviews and on seller reviews 
separately. 
 
Reviews for Products 
There are twenty articles that directly test the consequences of product reviews. Seven of 
those studies focus on the motion picture industry and examine movie sales and revenues. Other 
studies focus on software, books, video games, digital cameras, beauty products, etc. The most 
extensive study is one by Tirunillai and Tellis (2012), which involves 15 firms across 6 markets. 
Table 1.1 shows that, in terms of sales and revenue, review valence has more consistent 
influence than volume and variance; however, in terms of companies’ financial performances, 
such as stock market return, volume seems to have more influence than valence. While Tirunillai 
and Tellis (2012) find that review valence has no impact, Chen et al.(2012) find that it is changes 
in the review valence, not the absolute valence, that affects firms’ stock returns. 
Some authors also suggest the importance of looking at interactions between review 
statistics and other possible moderators. Sun (2012) find that, for online book sales, there view 
valence interacts with review variance, so that when valence is low, higher variance leads to 
higher sales. Khare et al. (2011) demonstrate the possibility of interactions among review 
valence, variance, and volume in forming consumer preferences. While many studies find that 
negative reviews have more impact than positive reviews on sales and revenue (Basuroy et al., 
2003; Chen et al., 2011), Clemons et al. (2006) find that for beer, a frequently purchased product, 
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high-end reviews actually carry more weight than low-end reviews. Increasing the variety of the 
products in one category can also weaken the relationship between product reviews and sales 
(Zhou and Duan, 2011).Another important aspect of product that needs to be considered is 
popularity. Duan et al. (2009) find that review valence does not influence the adoption of popular 
software, but it has a significant impact on adoptions of less popular (niche) software. Similarly, 
Zhu and Zhang (2010) find that review valence and variance only impact sales of less popular 
video games. Park et al. (2011) suggest looking beyond product reviews in a single market, 
because consumers can visit different websites to obtain review information for the same 
product. The authors find that the relationship between review valence and sales on one website 
is influenced not only by the volume of reviews accumulated on that website, but also by the 
volume of reviews for the same product on other websites. The detail results of these twenty 
studies are listed in Table 1.2. 











Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006  +  
Clemons et al., 2006  + + 
Li and Hitt, 2008 + +  
Duan et al., 2009  + or NS  
Chintagunta et al., 2010 NS + NS 
Moon et al., 2010   +  
Zhu and Zhang, 2010 + + or NS   or NS 
Chen et al., 2011 + NS  
Park et al., 2011  +  
Sun, 2012 + +  
Revenue 
Basuroy et al., 2003  ,   , or NS   
Liu, 2006 + NS  
Duan et al., 2008 +   
Moe and Trusov, 2011 NS + NS 
Financial 
Performance 
Chen et al., 2012  NS  
Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012 + NS  
* For studies that also report the valence of negative reviews, I only summarize the impact 




























Review valence (both positive percentage and 
negative percentage) influence revenue. 
Negative review number influences revenue 
more than positive review number, but the 
influence of negative review number 
diminishes over time. 
Review volume has mixed influence on 
revenue. In different weeks after the movie is 
released, it has either positive, negative or no 
impact on revenue. 
Chevalier and 
Mayzlin, 2006 





Increase in review valence leads to increase in 
relative sales.  
The impact of negative (1-star) reviews is 
larger than positive (5-star) reviews. 
Clemons, 




Sales Beer  Ratebeer.com 
Both review valence and variance are 
positively related to future sales. 
High-end ratings are weighted more than low-










Revenue Movie Yahoo! Movies 
WOM activities are most active during a 
movie’s prerelease and opening week.  
WOM offers significant explanatory power 
for both aggregate and weekly box office 
revenue, especially in the early weeks after a 
movie opens.  
Most of this power comes from the volume of 
WOM (through awareness), not from its 










Product(s) Source(s) Results 











Movies, and Box 
Office Mojo 
Separate the effect of online WOM as a 
precursor and an outcome of retail sales. 
Both a movie’s box office revenue and WOM 
valence significantly influence WOM volume; 
volume in turn leads to higher box office 
revenue 




star scale)  
Sales  Book Amazon 
Sales are positively related to review volume 
and valence. 










Product ratings have no impact on users’ 
choice of popular software, and have a 
significant positive impact on the adoption of 
less popular products. 













Review valence and variance moderate the 
impact of product attributes: quality and 
preference on consumers’ purchase intentions. 
Review valence and variance moderate the 












Review valence influence recommendation 
intent. 
When review is positive, the impact is 







item scale), and 
variance 
Sales Movie Yahoo! Movies 
Review valence has positive impact on sales. 
















Review valence Revenue Movie  
Rotten Tomatoes 
and Yahoo! Movies 
Critics’ ratings significantly influence movie 
revenue during the opening week while 
amateurs’ do not. 
Amateurs’ ratings influence movie review in 
the later weeks only when they are supported 








Sales Video game 
NPD 
GameSpot 
Review volume has a positive influence on 
sales of games.  
Review valence has a positive influence on 
the sales only for less popular games.  
Review coefficient of variation has a negative 
influence on sales only for less popular 
games.  
Reviews (volume, rating, and variation) do 
not influence the sales of games without 
online capability. 
Chen, Wang, 
and Xie, 2011 












Review volume has a positive impact on 
sales. Review valence does not have an 
impact on sales.  
Percentage of 5-star reviews does not have an 
impact on sales.  
Percentage of 1-star reviews has a negative 




















Preference Movie Experiment 
Interaction between review valence and 
volume: when review valence is negative, 
volume has negative impact on preference; 
when valence is positive, volume has positive 
impact on preference. 
Interaction among review valence, volume 
and consensus: when valence is positive and 
volume is high, low consensus decreases the 
preference; when valence is negative and 
volume is high, low consensus increases the 
preference; and when volume is low, 














A national retailer 
website 
Increases in review valence encourage the 
subsequent posting of negative ratings, but 
discourage positive ratings.  
Increases in review variance negatively 
impact subsequent posting or extremely 
negative and extremely positive reviews. 
Increases in review volume increase all star 
level reviews.  
The magnitude of such impact is larger for 
negative ratings than for positive ratings. 
Baseline model: review valence, volume and 
variance all have positive impact on sales. 
Deviations from baseline model (caused by 
social dynamics): review valence directly 
(positively or negatively) affects sales. 










Product(s) Source(s) Results 












The impact of review valence from a specific 
website on a product positively interacts with 
its own volume and the volume of reviews for 
the same product from another website. 
The influence of review valence increases as 
its own volume increases, and decreases as 














compression   
CNET 
Download.com 
The increase in product variety weakens the 
impact of both positive and negative user 
reviews, and this weakening effect is more 





















Yahoo! Movie,  
TNS media 
intelligence, 
9 major US 
newspapers and 5 
major entertainment 
publications 
Relative valence influences firm value, but 
absolute valence does not, and the influence is 
greater during the prerelease period than the 
post-release period. 
For a given level of average valence, a larger 
number of earlier reviews may attract more 
investor attention and makes the deviation 




















Review valence and volume have positive 
impacts on sales; standard deviation leads to 
relatively higher sales if and only if the 






























Review volume has a significant positive 
impact on short-term and long-term stock 
returns. 
Number of negative reviews has a stronger 
impact on returns than positive reviews. 
Review valence does not impact stock returns. 
Review volume and the volume of negative 
reviews influence trading volume in both the 
short and long term.  
Negative reviews also positively influence 
firms’ idiosyncratic risk. 
Off-line TV advertising increases review 




Reviews for Sellers 
When reviewing the literature on the relationship between seller review and outcome, I 
found twenty-three studies that directly tested the consequences of seller reviews. Most of the 
products studied came from three categories: electronic products, such as digital cameras, 
laptops, MP3 players, and cell phones; collectable products, such as antique silverware, stamps, 
and gold coins; and entertainment products, such as books and DVDs. Lei (2011) chose a unique 
product to study: G-mail invitations. The nature of this product makes it possible to separate 
uncertainty related to sellers from uncertainty about the product condition. This product is only 
sold on the consumer-to-consumer market for a short period of time, and product condition does 
not vary. The only uncertainty related to the purchase is whether the seller will honestly deliver 
the product after the transaction (Lei, 2011). 
Compared to research on product reviews, research on seller reviews focuses more on 
one particular market, eBay.com (seventeen out of the twenty three studies use data collected 
from eBay). One study (Wu and Ayala, 2012) tests the hypotheses with both experimental data 
and eBay transaction data. Since eBay reports several statistics, measurements of seller 
reputation show a little variation in the literature. The original eBay system allowed users to 
leave feedback for each other after each transaction, and eBay would summarize the number of 
positive, neutral, and negative reviews from unique users, along with a feedback score, or the 
number of positive reviews minus the number of negative reviews left by unique members. 
Weinber and Davis (2005) provide a snapshot of eBay’s original review profile. eBay later added 
positive feedback percentage to user profiles. Positive feedback percentage is calculated as the 
number of positive reviews divided by the sum of positive and negative reviews left by unique 
members. A snapshot of an eBay review profile from2004 can be found in Zhang (2006). In 
2007, eBay changed the calculation of positive feedback percentage by limiting the reviews 
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included to those posted within a year instead of all reviews in a user’s history, while 
maintaining the calculation of the feedback score. The cumulative counts of positive, neutral, and 
negative reviews throughout a user’s history were no longer listed in user profiles. Figure 1.1 
shows a snapshot of the newest review profile. 
Many studies examine the impact of the feedback score, because this statistic combines 
review volume and review valence. While the feedback score has a consistent impact on sales 
and bidding participation, its impact on price is ambiguous. Feedback score has been shown to 
impact the price of auctions for G-mail invitations (Lei, 2011) and MP3 players (Sung and Liu, 
2010) but not pennies (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007) or magazines (Zhou et al., 2008). Even for 
the same product category, Obloj and Capron (2011) find that feedback score contributes to the 
price premium a seller can charge for cell phone auctions, but Huang et al. (2011) find no impact 
on auction price. The mixed results suggest that ratings that combine review volume and valence 
may not be sufficient for explaining consumers’ preferences towards sellers. 
As the impact of a single feedback score is unclear, many studies separate positive and 
negative reviews, using these two variables to indicate seller reputation independently. However, 
results are still mixed. The table below shows that separating positive and negative reviews still 
does not provide a clear picture of how seller reviews influence transaction outcomes, especially 
price. A negative review number does not always influence price (Ba and Paylou, 2002; 
Livingston, 2005), and the number of positive reviews can have a positive impact (Standifird, 
2001; Ba and Paylou, 2002; Livingston, 2005; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Zhang, 2006; Reiley 
et al., 2007), no impact (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003) or even a negative 













Standifird, 2001 +  
Ba and Pavlou, 2002 
+ for 13 products 
NS for 5 products 
  for 2 products 
NS for 16 products 
Melnik and Alm, 2002   
Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003   or NS  
Livingston, 2005 + NS 
Houser and Wooders, 2006 +  
Zhang, 2006 + NS 
Reiley et al., 2007 +  
Sung and Liu, 2010  NS 
Bockstedt and Goh, 2011 +  
Sales 
Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003 NS  
Livingston, 2005 + NS 
Willingness to 
Bid 
Melnik and Alm, 2002   
Livingston, 2005 +  
Park and Bradlow, 2005 NS  
 
Zhou et al. (2008) compare different forms of review ratings provided by eBay and find 
that ratings that weight positive against negative reviews, such as review valence (the percentage 
of positive reviews), are more effective than feedback score in influencing auction price. Hence, 
to understand the role of reviews in consumers’ decision-making processes, it is very important 
to look at the influence of review valence and review volume separately, as well as at the 
interaction between them (Khare et al., 2011; Park et al., 2012; Sun, 2012). 
Table 1.4 provides a detailed summary of the results from the twenty-three studies. 
 
MOTIVATION FOR MY RESEARCH 
My research is motivated by the fact that research on online reviews has generated 
abundant information at the market, firm/product, and consumer levels; however, not enough 
studies incorporate consumer characteristics when investigating online reviews at the firm or  
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Pilot V  
eBay 
Total number of positive reviews has a 
limited positive influence on bidding price. 
Total number of negative reviews has a 

















Negative reviews have a stronger impact than 
positive reviews on buyer’s trust in sellers. 
Trust mediates the relationship between 
reviews and price premiums.  
Product price moderates the relationship 
between trust and price premiums.  
Empirical study: 
Positive review number has positive impact 
on price premiums for 13 out of 18 products.  
Negative review number has negative impact 
on price premiums for only 2 of the 18 
products.  
Product price only moderates the relationship 










Gold coin   eBay 
Feedback score has a significant positive 
impact on WTB and price. 
Negative review number has a significant 

























Closing price is measured as the percentage of 
the average successful closing price. 
Number of positive reviews has no impact on 
auction success, either no or a negative 









Feedback score has a positive impact on 
price. The influence of feedback score is 








Stamp eBay and MR 
Prices are 10-15% lower on eBay than on 
MR. Feedback score has a statistically 
significant effect on auction price and 









to bid, sales, 
and price 
Gold club  eBay 
The number of positive reviews has a positive 
influence on bidders’ willingness to bid, sales, 
and price, but the marginal effects diminish. 
Percentage of negative reviews has a negative 
influence on willingness to bid, but no 











A Korean internet 
auction site 
Number of positive reviews has no impact on 
willingness to bid. 
Number of negative reviews negatively 




















price of the 
item sold or 
the highest 





The mean negative percentage is 0.502%, and 
59.4% of the sellers have no negative 
feedback. 
STDDEV measures how uncertainty about the 
negative portion by the standard deviation 
declines as the number of feedback increases; 
it has a negative impact on price, which 
means that total review number has a positive 
impact on price.  
Percentage of negative reviews has a negative 


















Number of positive reviews has a positive 
impact on price.  
Number of neutral plus negative reviews has a 









MP3 player  eBay 





























Review from buyers: number of positive 
reviews positively influences the final bidding 
price; number of negative reviews negatively 
influences final bid and sales; no significant 
impact of the number of positive or negative 
buying reviews on final bids or sales. 
Total number of positive reviews positively 
influence final bid price, but total number of 











A Korean internet 
auction site 
Review valence has a positive impact on 
willingness to pay.  
Negative reviews do not have any impact on 
















Head pennies  
eBay 
Feedback score does not influence price. 
Total number of positive reviews has a 
positive influence on price.  
Total number of negative reviews has a 
negative influence on price.  
The impact of negative reviews is larger than 





% of positive 




days it takes 
for product 








Review valence has a positive influence on 
the time it takes to sell products. 
Review number has a positive influence. 
Percentage of positive reviews has a positive 
influence.  











Product(s) Source(s) Results 
Li, 
Srinivasan, 
and Sun, 2009 
Feedback score 
Willingness 







silver plate  
eBay 
High feedback score encourages bid 
participation, decreases bidders’ bidding 
amounts, and encourages bidders to bid early. 
The impact of credibility of seller is stronger 
















Direct counts (within the last 12 months) of 
positive and negative reviews significantly 
influence the final auction price. 
Feedback score and the difference between 
positive and negative review number within 
last 12 months do not significantly influence 
price. 
The effect of negative review number is larger 
than positive review number 
Review valence (positive percentage) has a 
significant influence on price. 







bid  plus 
shipping) 
iPod shuffle 
MP3 Player  
Yahoo! Taiwan 
Feedback score has a positive impact on 
price. The impact of feedback score is 
significantly different across reputation 
quartiles; negative review number does not 









Nintendo Wii  eBay 
Total number of positive reviews is 
significantly associated with higher price 
premiums. Review valence does not have a 
significant effect on price premiums because 










Product(s) Source(s) Results 
Huang, Chen 






Nokia 8250 Yahoo! 
Feedback score significantly affects auction 
success, but not auction price. 














Feedback score has a positive impact on 
probability of sales and price. 
The squared feedback score has a negative 
impact on price. 
Feedback score related to selling Gmail 













auction site  
Seller review difference is the difference in 
feedback scores between seller and 
competitor divided by the sum of feedback 
scores. 
The price premium a reputable seller can 
charge increases with the size of the 
reputation gap (the difference in reputation) 
between the seller and its matched competitor, 




















and volume  
Willingness 
to pay  
(absolute 
and relative) 




Experimental data results: 
Review volume has no impact on absolute 
willingness to pay, and it has a positive 
impact on relative willingness to pay for risk-
averse and risk-neutral consumers, but no 
impact for risk-seeking consumers. 
Review valence has a positive impact on both 
absolute and relative willingness to pay for all 
consumers. 
Product price has a positive impact on 
absolute willingness to pay; it has a negative 
impact on relative willingness to pay for risk-
neutral consumers, but no impact for risk-
averse or risk-seeking consumers. 
Empirical data results: 
Review volume has no impact on absolute or 
relative willingness to pay for risk-averse and 
risk-seeking consumer, but a positive impact 
for risk-neutral consumers. 
Review valence has positive impacts on both 
absolute and relative willingness to pay for all 
consumers 
Product price has a positive impact on 
absolute willingness to pay for all consumers; 
it has a negative impact on relative 
willingness to pay for risk-averse consumers, 
no impact for risk-neutral consumers, and a 
positive impact for risk-seeking consumers. 
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market level. Especially with respect to review outcomes, a review of the literature indicates 
large inconsistencies in empirical results and conclusions. As mentioned by Wu and Ayala 
(2012), at the market or product level, variations cannot fully explain the inconsistency. The 
influence of online reviews must be understood from the consumer’s standpoint, and that 
understanding should be incorporated into managing online reviews at the product and firm 
level. 
To the best of my knowledge, Wu and Ayala (2012) is the first study that theorizes the 
influence of online reviews and consumer differences in price decisions, and investigates the 
impact of reviews at the consumer/individual level. They draw a theoretical framework from 
classical expected utility theory and incorporate seller’s review volume and valence into 
consumers’ judgment of risk level associated with the purchase. They propose that review 
volume and valence independently and directly impact a consumer’s judgment of purchase risk, 
which influences the price she is willing to pay for the seller. Because consumers can have 
different risk attitudes, for example, risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking, reviews have 
different effects on willingness to pay. Review valence should always positively influence a 
consumer’s willingness to pay, but the influence of review volume varies across consumer 
segments based on risk attitude. For risk-averse consumers, review volume has a positive impact 
on willingness to pay; for risk-neutral consumers, volume has no impact;and for risk-seeking 
consumers, volume has a negative impact. 
Sun (2012) studies consumer heterogeneity from another perspective. She assumes that 
all consumers are risk neutral, but differ in their taste for the product. In contrast toWu and 
Ayala’s (2012) research, she does not address how the difference in taste leads to different 
behaviors from consumers. In other words, she does not investigate the impact of heterogeneity 
at the consumer/individual level, but only uses the existence of heterogeneity to explain how 
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review variances interact with valence in influencing product sales at the firm/product level. 
Although Sun (2012) does not investigate the impact of online reviews across heterogeneous 
consumer segments, she makes an observation at the aggregated level that cannot be explained 
by Wu and Ayala’s (2012) framework. 
Motivated by these studies, I develop a framework that will combine the strengths of both 
perspectives. First, consistent with the study by Wu and Ayala (2012), I incorporate consumer-
level characteristics and look at different behaviors across consumers. Second, my framework 
can accommodate consumer behavior that leads to the interactions observed by Sun 
(2012).Third, my framework not only can account for the interactions between review valence 
and variance, but also can explain the three-way interactions between review valence, variance, 
and volume as documented by Khare et al. (2011). As a result, my framework predicts that 
online reviews can have opposite outcomes not only across consumers, but also within 
consumers. 
Specifically, I focus on exploring the bidirectional review system and how it is used by 
consumers to shape their willingness to pay for sellers with different review profiles. The 
following considerations play a part in my focus. 
First, online seller reviews are the most important online user reviews. Consumers can 
obtain information about products from other channels; for example, a consumer can visit local 
stores to check out the product and then purchase online. However, for sellers, most of the time 
consumers do not have comparable opportunities offline and online reviews become the main 
source of information. Wu et al. (2012) find that consumers perceive more uncertainty relating to 
online sellers than to products. The impact of online reviews should be more salient for sellers 




Second, bidirectional review is the most popular system used in online seller reviews. 
Each bidirectional review follows a Bernoulli distribution and a sample of reviews follows a 
binomial distribution (Wu and Ayala, 2012). Only volume and valence are important, because 
review variance is fully determined by the volume and valence. For a star-scale review system, 
review volume, valence, and variance are independent, and all three statistics are relevant when 
analyzing the characteristics of reviews. It makes sense to first analyze the impact of online 
reviews with respect to two variables, and then move to three variables. 
Third, as mentioned above, studies of the relationship between seller reviews and sale 
price have found the most inconsistent results. I also find that studying the impact on price is 
more interesting because, as consumers, we can always make decisions on whether to purchase, 
either offline or online, but we do not have the freedom to make decisions on price for offline 
purchases. Online purchases provide a great opportunity for directly studying consumers’ price 
decisions, or their willingness to pay, and can provide firms with insights that would be hard to 
obtain in offline settings. 
My dissertation is organized as follows. In Essay Two, I describe the development of my 
theoretical framework and test its internal validity with an experimental study. In Essay Three, I 




ESSAY TWO. ONLINE REVIEWS AND CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS 




As discussed in Essay One, my research will explore how a bidirectional review for a 
seller influences consumers’ purchase decisions. More specifically, my study will focus on how 
a seller’s review number (volume) and percentage of positive reviews (valence) influence 
consumers’ willingness to pay. 
A review of the literature reveals that empirical studies have generated mixed results 
concerning the relationship between seller review statistics and the price a seller can charge. A 
closer look at these studies shows that the measurements related to review volume, such as 
feedback scores, number of positive reviews, and number of negative reviews, all have 
inconsistent influences on price. On the other hand, review valence has shown a relatively 
consistent influence. As shown in Table 2.1,only one study finds that review valence has no 
significant impact on price; however, Bockstedt and Goh (2011) explain  that this result may be 
due to the large concentration of high review valence in the dataset. Similar findings are 
documented by Wu and Ayala (2012), who find that review valence consistently influences 
price, but the impact of review volume is ambiguous. 
Table 2.1 The Impact of Review Valence on Price 
Article % of Positive Reviews (Valence) % of Negative Reviews 
Livingston, 2005  NS 
Chan et al., 2007 +  
Ghose, 2009 +  
Bockstedt and Goh, 2011 NS  




Several studies try to provide theoretical explanations for the mixed results observed in 
empirical studies. The authors break down the aggregate data to directly examine at segment or 
even the individual level for possible explanations, postulating a relationship between seller 
reviews and consumers’ willingness to pay. They propose that heterogeneity across consumers 
may explain the ambiguous relationship between online seller reviews, especially review 
volume, and the price of the product. 
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001) assume that, although all consumers are risk averse, they 
may differ in degree, and find that review volume and valence have an impact on price only for 
those consumers who are highly risk averse. Wu and Ayala (2012) and Wu et al. (2012) relax 
such a restriction and assume that consumers can be risk averse, risk neutral, or even risk 
seeking. If a consumer is risk averse, she will always prefer sellers with a large review volume; if 
a consumer is risk seeking, she will always prefer sellers with a small review volume; and if a 
consumer is risk neutral, she basically does not care about review volume. The common theme 
among these studies is that they use classic expected utility theory as a framework. Under such a 
framework, the preference towards risk or uncertainty (hence preference towards review volume) 
can vary across individuals but should be consistent within an individual. However, studies in 
other contexts such as insurance, warranties (Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1992), and financial 
assets (Sarin and Weber, 1993) have found that consumers change their preferences towards 
uncertainty depending on the probability of obtaining an outcome. I am interested in exploring 
whether such a change in preference will also occur when the purchase is made from online 
sellers. Thus, I hope to extend previous studies and provide further explanations for the impact of 
online seller reviews on willingness to pay by proposing that differences in preference towards 
uncertainty (hence towards review volume) not only exists across individuals, but also exists 
within an individual (at least for some consumers). 
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In the rest of Essay Two, I discuss the theoretical frameworks that model people’s 
preference towards uncertainty, state specific hypotheses, present an experimental study, and, 
finally, propose an approach for testing the external validity of my framework. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Hereafter, I use the word “prospect” to represent a gamble-like problem. The remainder 
of this essay focuses on a prospect with two outcomes: obtaining outcome x if event E happens 
and outcome 0 if E does not. Let p be the true probability of event E, and a person will make 
decisions based on her assessment of the overall value of the prospect (x, p; 0, 1-p). There is a 
risk associated with outcome x when p is not 0 or 1;that is, we are not sure to obtain outcome x or 
0. Many studies extend the concept of uncertainty using a more general framework in which not 
only is the outcome uncertain, the probability of each outcome is also ambiguous. Motivated by 
observations first documented by Ellsberg (1961), researchers have focused their efforts on 
theorizing decision rules that account for uncertainty generated partly by the risk of an unsure 
outcome and partly by the ambiguity concerning the probability of each possible outcome (Kahn 
and Sarin, 1988; Hoarth and Einhorn, 1990; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Fox and Tversky, 
1995; Kilka and Weber, 2001). 
 
Modeling Decisions under Uncertainty 
The framework of expected utility theory. Expected utility theory holds that the over-
all value of the prospect is   
               [           ]                    
where       is the expected utility function and U(•) is the utility function with U(0)=0. 
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Generally speaking, expected utility theory assumes that a person’s rational decision-
making process follows certain assumptions (named axioms), and that under these assumptions 
we can obtain numeric measures of her utility assessments of a prospect’s outcomes. A person 
will make decisions based on the utilities and probabilities of prospect’s outcomes (Weber and 
Camerer, 1987; Hastie and Dawes, 2001). 
The framework of prospect theory (PT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). 
Human behaviors that violate the assumptions of expected utility theory motivated the 
development of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). To accommodate these 
behavioral patterns, prospect theory proposes separating the value and weighting functions when 
judging the overall value of a prospect. 
                                           
where      is the value function of an outcome and       , and      is the weighting 
function for the stated probability.  
The properties of value function     . Prospect theory holds that the value of an outcome 
conforms to a concept of “changes in wealth or welfare.”A person does not measure the value of 
an outcome based on its final state, but rather on the difference between the final state and the 
current state of that person. Thus, the value function involves two aspects:“the asset position that 
serves as reference point and the magnitude of the change (positive or negative) from that 
reference point”(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 page 277).Specifically, the value function is 
defined as generally concave for gains-outcomes’ final states positively deviate from the 
reference point and convex for losses-outcomes’ final states negatively deviate from the 















Figure 2.1 Value Function of Prospect Theory 
 
Since the value function is different for gains than for losses, a separation of decisions 
under gains and under losses becomes necessary. This separation can be achieved using gain- 
and loss-framing. In gain-framing, information is presented as a positive outcome as compared to 
a person’s current state, with the associated probabilities, while in loss-framing, information is 
presented as a negative outcome. Examples of gain-framing and loss-framing are shown below. 
Table 2.2 Examples of Decision Framings 




Of 100 people having surgery 90 
live through the post-operative 
period, 68 are alive at the end of 
the first year and 34 are alive at 
the end of five years. 
Of 100 people having surgery 
10 die during surgery or the 
post-operative period, 32 die 
by the end of the first year and 
66 die by the end of five years. 
Gambles 
(Compare to A Sure 
Gain/ Loss) 
25% chance to gain $1000 and 
75% chance to gain nothing  
75% chance to lose $1000 and 
25% chance to lose nothing  
Source: Tversky and Kahneman, 1986 






The properties of weighting function     . Prospect theory transforms stated 
probabilities into decision weights that measure “the impact of events on the desirability of 
prospects” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 page 280). The weighting function is an increasing 
function of stated probability with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. The slope of the weighting function 
measures the sensitivity of a person’s preference towards the change in probability. Prospect 
theory describes several properties of weighting function: (1) overweighting: people tend to 
overweight very low probabilities, (2) subcertainty: the sum of weights associated with 
complementary events is generally less than the weight associated with the certain event, and (3) 
subproportionality: for a fixed ratio of probabilities, the ratio of corresponding decision weights 
is closer to unity when the probabilities are low. Based on these properties, a weighting function 




























Source: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 
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In the more general uncertainty framework, additional uncertainty results from missing or 
ambiguous information about outcome probability p; hence, researchers usually use the 
weighting function to account for this type of uncertainty. In an update of prospect theory, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) point out that the weighting function in the original theory does 
not always satisfy stochastic dominance, cannot account for situations where outcome 
probabilities are unclear, and cannot be well extended to prospects with a large number of 
outcomes. To overcome these limitations, they re-frame the concept of prospect theory using 
rank-dependent utility theory, naming it cumulative prospect theory. Cumulative prospect theory 
allows for separate weighting functions for gains and losses. The decision weight associated with 
an outcome is interpreted as a marginal contribution of the outcome. Specifically, the decision 
weight associated with a positive outcome xi is the difference between the capacities of events 
with the outcome that is “at least as good as xi” and of events with the outcome that is “strictly 
better than xi”(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 page 301)The decision weight associated with a 
negative outcome is the difference between the capabilities of the events with the outcome that is 
“at least as bad as xi” and of events with the outcome that is “strictly worse than xi”(Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992 page 301). However, when a prospect has two non-mixed outcomes, both 
positive or both negative, cumulative prospect theory and the original prospect theory yield the 
same prediction, because, under these conditions, original prospect theory is rank dependent. 
Cumulative prospect theory proposes that the weighting function should satisfy both 
lower subadditivity, “the impact of an event A is greater when it is added to a null event than 
when it is added to some nonnull event B” (Tversky and Fox, 1995 page 270), and upper 
subadditivity, “the impact of an event A is greater when it is subtracted from the certain event 
than when it is subtracted from some uncertain event    ”( Tversky and Fox, 1995 page 271). 
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These characteristics lead to a reversely S-shaped weighting function, which holds that people 





















Figure 2.3 Weighting Function of Cumulative Prospect Theory 
 
Tversky and Fox (1995) test the characteristics of the weighting function in the more 
general uncertainty situations in which ambiguity about outcome probability exists, and they find 
that both lower and upper subadditivities apply to the more general uncertainty, and such effects 
are amplified when outcome probabilities are unclear. The smooth function used to fit the 
weighting function in the cumulative prospect theory is shown below. The same form of the 
weighting function also has been tested by many other studies (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Prelec, 
1998; Schimdt et al., 2008). 
      
   
                
 
where p’ is the stated probability, and   is the parameter that influences the shape of the 



















Other frameworks for decisions under uncertainty. Kahn and Sarin (1988) extend 
subjective utility theory (which is an extension of classic expected utility theory) and propose a 
decision model that depends on the entire distribution of  p, assuming p is a random variable. 
Let      denote the density of the random variable p and  ̅ is the average of p. Then the 
over-all value of the prospect             is: 
                            ̅  ∫     ̅  
[      ̅ ]
       
 
   
 
  √∫     ̅  
 
   
       is the standard deviation of the random variable p, and λ is a 
person’s attitude towards uncertainty about probabilities. Using a first-order Taylor 
approximation of  
[      ̅ ]
 , the weighting function w(p) can be expressed by the first-order 
approximation  
      ̅     
The weighting function states that the subjective probability of event E is deviated from 
average probability  ̅ and that the deviation is related to the standard deviation of the random 
variable p. 
The framework proposed by Einhorn and Hogarth (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, 1986; 
Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990) is built on an idea similar to prospect theory. The authors propose 
that a person may take an anchoring-and adjustment strategy. When the true probability p of 
event E (hence the outcome) is unknown, a person can start with an anchor, such as the stated 
probability   , and then make either an upwards or downwards adjustment based on the level of 
probability, amount of uncertainty perceived, and the person’s attitude towards uncertainty about 
probabilities. The weighting function is expressed as follows: 
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where θ (       is the absolute size of adjustment and β is the attitude towards uncertainty 
about probabilities. β> 1 implies that a person places more weight on probabilities that are larger 
than    and that      is larger than   for most of the range of   .In contrast, β <1 implies that a 
person places more weight on probabilities that are smaller than   and that       is smaller than 













Figure 2.4 Weighting Function of Einhorn and Hogarth’s Model 
 
Many researchers have proposed other smooth models to describe a reversely S-shaped 
weighting function. For example, Prelec (1998) proposes an exponential function with either one 
parameter or two parameters; Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose a nonparametric estimation of 
weighting function at individual level, and by using this method they find that a two-parameter 























Source: Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985 
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domain of gains, one of which represents how a subject discriminates probability and the other of 
which measures how attractive the gambling is.  
The difference between expected utility theory and the behavioral theories discussed 
above is that under expected utility theory, the overall value of a prospect is determined by the 
true probability p, which is assessed by the stated sample probability    through a mean-variance 
model. Behavior theories argue that when information about pis missing, people in general 
experience extra uncertainty resulted from the ambiguity of probability. They propose nonlinear 
transformations from the stated probability    to a subjective weight, either a decision weight that 
measures the desirability of event E (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu, 1996; 
Prelec, 1998) or a subjective probability that measures subjective likelihood of event E (Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988). Depending on the shape of the transformation 
function, a person may overweight or underweight probabilities based on the level of the stated 
probability. The magnitude of overweighting/underweighting is related to various factors. If the 
stated probability    comes from a sample used to estimate the true probability of an outcome, 
then the size of the sample, the source credibility of the sample, and the degree of agreement or 
disagreement among the sources should influence the magnitude of the adjustment (Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1985, 1986; Camerer and Weber, 1992). The larger the sample size, the higher the 
source credibility, and the smaller the disagreement among sources, the smaller the magnitude of 
adjustment and subjective probabilities will approach the stated probabilities. 
 
Preference towards Uncertainty 
The framework of expected utility theory. According to expected utility theory, 
people's preferences towards risk can be different. When comparing two prospects, prospect A 
(x, p; 0, 1-p) and prospect B (xp, 1; 0, 0),it is obvious that B is the certainty equivalent of 
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prospect A. However, not all people see them as equal. For people who place more value on B 
than A (hence prefer B to A), the suggestion is that they value a certain prospect more than an 
uncertain one, and therefore that these people are risk averse. People who place more value on A 
than B (hence prefer A to B) are risk seeking. Finally, people who are indifferent to the prospects 
A and B are risk neutral. This concept, called risk attitude, establishes the difference between 
individuals in terms of their preferences towards uncertainty. Mathematically, a person’s risk 
attitude can be determined by the shape of her expected utility function (determined by x and p 
together), with a concave expected utility function representing risk averse, a convex expected 
utility function representing risk seeking, and a linear expected utility function representing risk 
neutral. Risk attitude can be interpreted as a kind of personality, which is consistent under a 
specific context. So if a person is risk averse, she will always prefer the certainty equivalent 
regardless of whether p is large or small. 
The framework of prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory. According to 
prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory, a person’s preference towards uncertainty is 
determined jointly by the value function and the weighting function. In general, a reversely S-
shaped weighting function plus a concave-shaped value function for gains leads to uncertainty-
seeking behavior for gaining a prize of small probabilities and uncertainty-averse behavior for 
gaining a prize of large probabilities. The same shape of weighting function plus a convex-
shaped value function for losses leads to uncertainty-averse behavior for losing at small 
probabilities and risk-seeking behavior for losing at large probabilities. 
Other frameworks for decisions under uncertainty. Einhorn and Hogarth (1985,1986) 
propose a pattern similar to that found in prospect theory. They assume that people are generally 
defensive pessimistic about gaining something: they will overweight small probabilities and 
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underweight moderate to large probabilities. Hence, they display risk-averse behavior for gaining 
at small probabilities and risk-seeking behavior for gaining at moderate and large probabilities. 
Kahn and Sarin (1988) do not directly describe the behavior of the majority under 
uncertainty; however, they advocate the idea that a person’s preference towards uncertainty can 
vary with  ̅.In other words, a person’s preference towards uncertainty can depend on the 
expected probability that event E will happen. A simple way of incorporating such a variation of 
preference into their model is to allow a person’s attitude towards uncertainty λ to be a linear 
function of  ̅. As a result, the first-order approximation of their model can be rewritten as 
follows: 
      ̅       ̅   
Expected utility theory acknowledges the differences across individuals in terms of 
preference towards uncertainty; however, that preference should be consistent within an 
individual and independent of the probability of obtaining an outcome. In contrast, behavior 
theories propose that even within an individual, a change in preference towards uncertainty may 
occur, depending on the level of stated probability   . 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, I develop the proposition regarding consumer heterogeneity, and propose 
the influences of review volume and valence for different consumers. 
 
Online Purchase Decision: Willingness to Pay (WTP)  
Assume that the reference point of a consumer before purchasing a product with 
monetary value V from an online seller is 0. The purchase can be simplified to a two-outcome 
prospect: a consumer is either being satisfied by the seller or not, where the value of being 
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satisfied is gaining V and the value of being not satisfied is 0. Let p denote the true probability 
that a consumer will be satisfied by the online seller for the transaction. The purchase decision in 
terms of willingness to pay can be represented as how much the consumer is willing to pay to 
purchase the prospect (V, p; 0, 1-p). Assuming that when determining the price of a prospect, 
people tend to evaluate the outcome (V, p; 0, 1-p) and cost (-WTP, 1) separately (Kahneman and 
Tvresky, 1979), the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) will be determined as 
v(V, p; 0, 1-p) + v(-WTP) = 0 
Seller review information is presented as the probability of gaining the product and being 
satisfied by the seller, so the framing of a bidirectional seller review is a gaining framing. The 
basic idea behind seller reviews is that a consumer does not know the true probability p that she 
will be satisfied by the seller and can only use a sample to estimate p. Previous customers who 
provide reviews about a seller form a sample of the population (all customers of that seller). A 
bidirectional review system entails that the sample follows a binomial distribution; the review 
volume N is the size of the sample; the review valence   , the percentage of positive reviews, is 
the sample mean; and the estimator of p,
        
 
,is the variance of the sample mean  (Wu and 
Gaytan, 2010). According to prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory, the price a 
consumer is willing to pay is then determined by the subjective value of the prospect (V, p ; 0, 1-
p ) as perceived by that consumer. 
        [                          ]      [            ]  
where              , and w(  ) is an increasing function of    
As the main focus of the current research is the weighting function, which previous 
studies have theorized is the source of reversed preference towards uncertainty for gains with 
different probabilities, I will set the value V at a constant level and examine a consumer’s 
preference towards uncertainty using the weighting function w(  , N). 
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Proposition: The Shape of Weighting Function w(  , N) 
As discussed earlier, previous research (Wu and Ayala, 2012; Wu et al., 2012) developed 
using the framework of expected utility theory assumes that uncertainty preference only differs 
across individuals. While behaviorists argue that people tend to have reverse preferences towards 
uncertainty for gains of small probability and for gains of large probability, List (2004) finds that 
in the marketplace, prospect theory explains the behavior of inexperienced consumers well. 
However, consumers with greater market experience tend to conform to the predictions of classic 
expected utility theory. In market like eBay, where variety exists among consumers, it is 
reasonable to expect to observe the behavioral patterns predicted by both frameworks. I extend 
the previous research by allowing the differences in preference towards uncertainty to exist not 
only across individuals, but also within an individual (at least for some consumers). So, the 
assumption is that there is heterogeneity of consumers in the shapes of the weighting function. 
First, there are consumers who consistently overweight or underweight all probabilities. For 
these consumers, their preference towards uncertainty can be described by the risk attitude of 
expected utility theory. Specifically, if a consumer consistently overweights all probabilities (a 
concave-shaped weighting function), then she is a risk-seeking person; if a consumer 
consistently underweights all probabilities (a convex-shaped weighting function), then she is a 
risk-averse person; and if a consumer neither overweights nor underweights any probability (a 
linear weighting function), then she is a risk-neutral person. Second, there are consumers who do 
not consistently overweight or underweight probabilities. As discussed before, a reversely S-
shaped weighting function has been proposed under the assumption that people are generally 
defensive pessimistic about gains (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985,1986). I relax this restriction, 
allowing consumers to have a weighting function that is S-shaped. Consumers who underweight 
small probabilities and overweight large probabilities have weighting functions with an S shape, 
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and consumers who overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities have 
weighting functions with a reversed S shape.  For consumers with either an S-shaped or reversely 
S-shaped weighting function, there exists a cross-over point (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985, 1986) 
where w(  , N) =   . 
Proposition. A consumer’s weighting function is  
a. concave if she overweights all probabilities. 
b. convex if she underweights all probabilities. 
c. linear if she neither overweights nor underweights any probability. 
d. S-shaped if she underweights small probabilities and overweights large 
probabilities. 
e. reversely S-shaped if she overweights small probabilities and underweights large 
probabilities.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The Impact of Seller Review (SR) Valence (p’) on Willingness to Pay 
Review valence is the stated probability obtained from a sample and is used to estimate 
the true probability of obtaining outcome v(V). Consistent with the underlying assumption of 
previous behavioral studies that the weighting function should be an increasing function of the 
stated probability, the weighting function w(  , N) should be an increasing function of review 
valence   . Hence the impact of review valence    on WTP should be positive for all consumers. 
H1.  For a seller with a higher SR valence (  ), a consumer is willing to pay a higher 






Hypothesis 2: The Impact of Seller Review Volume (N) on Willingness to Pay 
Review volume N is the size of the sample from which review valence    is obtained. The 
larger N is, the smaller the magnitude of overweighting/underweighting. As a result, the impact 
of review volume on WTP depends on whether a consumer overweights or underweights the 
review valence. For consumers who consistently overweight or underweight probabilities, the 
impact of review volume on WTP is consistent, either negative, positive, or insignificant. For 
consumers who do not consistently overweight/underweight, the impact of review volume N is 
determined by the shape of a consumer’s weighting function and by the level of review valence, 
specifically, whether valence is below or above the cross-over point. 
H2. For a seller with a higher SR volume (N), a consumer is willing to pay 
a. a lower price if the consumer has a concave-shaped weighting function.  
b. a higher price if the consumer has a convex-shaped weighting function.  
c. an equal price if the consumer has a linear-shaped weighting function.  
d1. a higher price if the consumer has an S-shaped weighting function and the SR 
valence (  ) is below the cross-over point.  
d2.  a lower price if the consumer has an S-shaped weighting function and the SR 
valence (  ) is above the cross-over point.  
e1.  a lower price if the consumer has a reversely S-shaped weighting function and the 
SR valence (  ) is below the cross-over point.  
e2.  a higher price if the consumer has a reversely S-shaped weighting function and the 
SR valence (  ) is above the cross-over point.  







Figure 2.5 Conceptual Framework 
 
 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
Study Design 
Subjects are asked to consider a purchase scenario in which they are about to purchase a 
42” LCD TV on a website. The TV is sold at local retail stores for $800. On the website, there 
are multiple sellers selling the new TV and the website provides reviews for each seller. Seller 
review has a bidirectional format, as shown below. 
The review volume has three levels: 20, 50, and 200, and the review valence has eleven 
levels: 0%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 100%. Each subject was 
provided with 33 seller profiles having different combinations of levels of volume and valence. 
Four versions of the survey were developed to counterbalance the order in which volumes and 
valences were shown to the subjects. 
 
Data Collection Procedure 
One-hundred forty-three business-school students at a southern public university were 
recruited for the study. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the four versions of the 
survey. Subjects were asked to provide the maximum price they were willing to pay each seller 
SR Valence ( p’ ) 
SR Volume ( N ) 
Weighting Function ( w(p’, N) ) 






for the product; the lowest price they could pay was $0. Three seller profiles appeared twice in 
the survey to test the inner reliability of the answers provided by each subject. These profiles 
were (20, 50%), (50, 50%), and (200, 50%), and appeared in the middle and then the end of the 
survey. 
 




Internal reliability. Internal reliability was assessed on the repeated seller profiles using 
the Pearson Correlation test. Subjects with a Pearson Correlation value below 0.8 were removed 
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from the dataset. For subjects who could not be tested using Pearson Correlation because they 
had the same reported WTP for different sellers, the pattern of reported WTP based on review 
volume was observed. Subjects with dramatic pattern changes, such as a reversed preference on 
review volume between the test and re-test sets, were removed from the dataset. 
Assess the shape of weighting function. The following model was used to estimate the 
weighting function for each subject: 
                        
        
 
 
where a, b, and c are parameters, and i represents the i
th
 individual 
Because product value is set at a constant level, I use an intercept, c, to capture the 
deviation of the subjective product value from the objective product price. 
The weighting function combines ideas from Kahn and Sarin (1988) and Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1985, 1986), adopting the form used by Kahn and Sarin (1988). Both studies state that 
the sample variance of random variable p’ will positively impact the magnitude of uncertainty. 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, 1986) also propose that magnitude is negatively associated with 
factors such as sample size and source credibility. As source credibility is not the focus of my 
dissertation, my weighting function model is only a function of sample variance          and 
sample size N. The term         describesa subject’s attitude towards uncertainty as a function 
of p’, which allows the attitude to change at different levels of p’. 
A slight modification was made without changing the properties of the function shapes. I 
use sample variance instead of standard deviation, used by Kahn and Sarin (1988). I chose this 
model specification for several reasons. First, the model directly incorporates the variables in 
which I am interested into the estimating weighting function. Second, the model can 
accommodate all five types of shapes. Lastly, using variance, the shape of the weighting function 
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can be directly determined by the estimates of parameters a and b. Subjects with the same shape 
of weighting function were then grouped together. For the S-shaped and reversely S-shaped 
weighting functions, the cross-over point is 
  
  
. Table 2.3 below shows how to use estimates of 
a and b to determine the shape of the weighting function for each subject. 
Table 2.3 Estimation of the Shape of Weighting Function 
Group  w(p) Shape  Description  Parameters  
1  Concave  Overweight all probabilities 
b=0 and a<0,  
b>0 and a/b≤ -1,  
b<0 and a/b≥ 0 
2  Convex  Underweight all probabilities 
b=0 and a>0,  
b>0 and a/b≥ 0,  
b<0 and a/b≤ -1 
3  Linear  Neither underweight nor overweight probabilities a = 0 and b = 0  
4  S-Shaped  
Underweight small probabilities 
Overweight large probabilities 




Overweight small probabilities 
Underweight large small probabilities 
b > 0 and -1 < a/b < 0 
 
Assess the impact of seller review valence and volume. The impact of SR valence and 
SR volume on WTP were assessed at the group level. For each group, formed by the shape of the 
weighting function, a linear regression was performed to test the impacts of valence and volume. 
I used a linear-log function because it was used in previous empirical research to test the 
relationship between seller reputation and price (Ba and Pavlou, 2002; Melnik and Alm, 2002; 
Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2011).The main reason for using a linear-log as 
opposed to a linear function is that it can capture the diminishing return of reputation on price as 
the seller reputation increases (Livingston, 2005; Obloj and Capron, 2011). For the S-shaped and 
reversely S-shaped weighting function groups, separate linear regressions were used to fit the 
data that fell below or above the cross-over point. 
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   (      )                                   
where i identifies the i
th
 individual, j represents the j
th




Internal reliability. Twenty-eight of the one-hundred forty-three students did not pass 
the internal reliability test and hence were removed from the original dataset. Examples of 
















Figure 2.7 Examples of Subjects Removed from the Data 
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The shapes of weighting function. All five groups of weighting function shapes were 
identified, supporting the proposition. For those subjects who consistently 
overweight/underweight all probabilities, 10 subjects have concave-shaped weighting functions 
corresponding to a risk-seeking attitude, 7 have convex-shaped weighting functions 
corresponding to a risk-averse attitude, and 22 subjects have linear-shaped weighting functions 
corresponding to a risk-neutral attitude. For those subjects who do not consistently 
overweight/underweight probabilities, 25 have S-shaped weighting functions and 51 have 
reversely S-shaped weighting functions. The plots of weighting functions by groups are provided 





























The impact of seller review valence and volume. R-square at the group level ranges 
from .206 for the linear weighting function group to .505 for the S-shaped weighting function 
group above the cross-over point. Supporting H2, the SR valence has a positive impact on WTP 
(p-value = .000) for all groups. 
As expected, the impact of SR volume on WTP varies across groups. For the concave 
group, SR volume has a negative impact on WTP (βN= –1.005 with significance at .000).For the 
convex group, SR volume has a positive impact on WTP (βN= .296 with significance at .059).For 
the linear group, SR volume has no impact on WTP (βN= –.194 with significance at .139).For the 
S-shaped group, SR volume has no impact on WTP(βN= –.027 with significance at .874) below 
the cross-over point, which is not consistent with the hypothesis, but the impact of SR volume is 
consistent with the hypothesis above the cross-over point (βN= –.184 with significance at 
.015).For the reversely S-shaped group, SR volume has a negative impact on WTP below the 
cross-over point (βN= –.542 with significance at .000) and a positive impact above the cross-over 
point(βN= .107 with significance at .030). In general, all hypotheses are supported excepted for 
the impact of SR volume on WTP for the S-shaped group when the SR valences are below the 
cross-over point. The detailed results are shown in Table 2.4. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results from the experimental study provide relatively strong support for the 
hypotheses. First, the data confirm that the impact of seller review volume on WTP not only 
varies across individuals, as maintained by previous research, but also, for some consumers, 
within an individual depending on the level of review valence. Second, the impact of review 




Table 2.4 The Impact of Online Reviews on Consumers’ WTP 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat p-value Hypothesis 
1. Concave Group (overweight) 
 Log(N) -1.005 0.175 -5.748 0.000 Support 
 Log(p’) 0.834 0.110 7.608 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.386     
 Student # 10     
2. Convex Group (underweight)    
 Log(N) 0.296 0.155 1.905 0.059 Marginal Support 
 Log(p’) 2.937 0.358 8.211 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.498     
 Student # 7     
3. Linear Group (neither underweight nor overweight) 
 Log(N) -0.194 0.131 -1.481 0.139 Support 
 Log(p’) 1.387 0.148 9.381 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.260     
 Student # 22     
4. S-Shaped Group 
Below cross-over point (underweight)    
 Log(N) -0.027 0.168 -0.158 0.874 Not Support 
 Log(p’) 1.207 0.181 6.651 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.324     
Above cross-over point (overweight)    
 Log(N) -0.184 0.076 -2.440 0.015 Support 
 Log(p’) 2.055 0.343 5.998 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.285     
 Student # 25     
5. Reversely S-Shaped Group    
Below cross-over point (overweight)    
 Log(N) -0.542 0.081 -6.717 0.000 Support 
 Log(p’) 0.359 0.045 8.044 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.405     
Above cross-over point (underweight)    
 Log(N) 0.107 0.049 2.173 0.030 Support 
 Log(p’) 2.591 0.195 13.276 0.000 Support 
 R-square 0.505     
 Student # 51     
With dummy variables for individuals 
 
overweight/underweight small/large probabilities or have a reversed pattern. Hence, the 
influence of volume on WTP can exhibit different patterns among consumers. 
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In the next essay, I assess the external validity of the framework. I have collected 
transactional data for Playstation 2 game consoles sold on eBay.com. I expect that the analysis of 
the empirical data will be much more difficult. Specifically, some covariate variables may need 
to be controlled. Therefore, additional information related to transactions will be recorded, such 
as the feedback score (review valence) for consumers who provide reviews to sellers, the time 
during the day at which the auction ends, the shipping options and other services provided by the 
seller, and so on. In contrast to the experimental data, it is also difficult to obtain multiple 
instances of data at the individual level to empirically assess the shape of the weighting function 
for each individual. Therefore, I plan to conduct my analyses at the segment level. First, 
consumers can be classified into the different groups using a finite mixture regression model. 
Second, the linear regression will be performed for each group just as it was for the experimental 
data. I demonstrate the technique of separating latent consumer groups with the proposed 




ESSAY THREE. ONLINE REVIEWS AND CONSUMERS WILLINGNESS 




Websites like eBay heavily depend on their review systems to build trustworthy 
marketplaces. However, as discussed in Essay One, we still lack clear evidence concerning how 
consumers use reviews in their purchase decisions for these markets. Many studies examine 
ratings that combine review volume and review valence, for example, the “Feedback Score” 
provided by eBay, but these studies have produced mixed results. To understand the role of 
reviews in consumers’ decision-making processes, it is very important to look at the influence of 
review valence and review volume separately, the possible interaction between them (Khare et 
al., 2011; Park et al., 2012), and consumer heterogeneity related to online reviews (Sun, 2012; 
Wu and Ayala, 2012) 
In Essay Two, I proposed that heterogeneity exists among consumers when using seller 
review information to determine willingness to pay. As a result, there are different interaction 
patterns between review valence and review volume. While seller review valence should always 
positively influence consumers’ willingness to pay, review volume varies among consumers, and 
the preference towards review volume can be described by a consumer’s weighting function. 
Combining classic expected utility and prospect theory frameworks, I proposed five shapes of 
weighting functions: concave, convex, linear, S-shaped, and reversely S-shaped. In an 
experimental study, I suggested that the preference towards review volume can be very complex. 
Not only can consumers have totally opposite preferences towards review volume, for some, 
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their preferences also can change according to review valence. My hypotheses are summarized in 
Table 3.1. 






H1. Impact of 
Review Valence 
p’ on WTP 
H2. Impact of 
Review Volume  
N on WTP 
1 Concave Overweight all probabilities +  
2 Convex Underweight all probabilities + + 
3 Linear 
Neither underweight nor 
overweight probabilities 




Overweight large probabilities 
+ 
+ 
Below cross-over point 
− 










Below cross-over point 
+ 
Above cross-over point 
 
There are several important considerations that motivate my empirical study. First, 
testing my theory in online markets is the common approach for establishing its external validity, 
and thus the relevance of my proposed theory for managerial implications. Second, online 
markets differ from a lab setting in many aspects. Consumers have different decision goals and 
processes; furthermore, seller reviews pose different and more challenging distributions. For 
example, the majority of sellers have review valences close to 100%. On one hand, studies find 
that people are biased when they process review information, placing more emphasis on review 
valence and underweighting review volume (Wolf and Muhanna, 2011). On the other hand, 
because of the large number of high review valences, it becomes less effective in separating good 
sellers from bad; hence, its impact on price premium becomes less significant (Bockstedt and 
Goh, 2011). Third, researchers often observe only a few transactions for a given time window. 
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This approach requires different statistical techniques for constructing variables and analyzing 
data than those used in my lab setting, which I will elaborate later in this essay. 
To provide insightful managerial implications, it is important to test whether the 
proposed heterogeneity exists in the real online market, and thereby establish the external 
validity of the framework. Thus, I will test my hypotheses with online transaction data collected 
from eBay.com. As discussed in Essay Two, it may be difficult to estimate a consumer’s 
weighting function individually when the data lacks sufficient observations from a single 
consumer. Also, to accommodate consumer differences and at the same time achieve economic 
efficiency, marketing strategies and activities are often directed toward segments rather than 
individuals. Hence, for online transactional data, it is more practical to test hypotheses atthe 
group level. Consistent with the method used in Wu and Ayala (2012), I will first use a finite 
mixture regression model to segment consumers based on their weighing functions and then test 
the hypotheses for each group. 
This essay contains the following sections. First, I introduce the method, finite mixture 
regression models, which allows me to simultaneously classify observations into groups using 
the weighing function model and estimate the parameters for each group. Second, I describe a 
simulation study that demonstrates the ability of finite mixture regression models to identify the 
underlying true weighting functions of different groups. Third, I explain my adoption of this 




For decades, marketers have used finite mixture regression models, also known as latent 
class regression models (DeSarbo and Cron, 1988), to identify different segments of consumers 
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whose preferences for marketing information vary. Finite mixture regression models,under the 
maximum likelihood framework, use the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to segment 
observations into different groups and provide maximum likelihood estimates for model 
parameters for each group. Based on Frühwirth-Schnatter (2006) and Leisch (2004), the 
definitions and principles of finite mixture regression models are explained below.
1
 
A random variable Y is sampled from a population comprised of K subgroups (usually 
called components), but group indicators not recorded. All group densities come from the same 
parametric distribution family with density f(θ), where parameter θ differs across groups. Then 
the conditional density of Y can be shown as below: 
   |     ∑  
 
   
   |      
where     , ∑     
 
   ,                      , h is the conditional density of 
y, x is a vector of independent variables, πk(also called weight distribution) is the prior 
probability of component k, θk is the component-specific parameter vector for the density 
function f, and   is the vector of all parameters.  
The posterior probability that an observation belongs to component j is specified below. 
Data can then be segmented by assigning each observation to the component with the maximum 
posterior probability.  
   |       
     |     
∑       |     
 
The log-likelihood of a sample of N observations is given by the equation below. Because 
the posterior probability usually cannot be estimated directly, the EM algorithm is used to obtain 
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters. 
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The EM algorithm can be used to compute maximum likelihood estimates for incomplete data 
for which the group indicator is missing. Each iteration of the EM algorithm involves an 
expectation step (E-step) followed by a maximization step (M-step) (Dempster et al., 1977). 
E-step estimates the posterior probability for each observation: 
 ̂      |       ̅  
and updates prior probability for each component: 
 ̂   
 
 
∑  ̂  
 
   
 
M-step uses the posterior probabilities of each observation as weights for calculating the 
maximum likelihood estimate for each component: 
     ∑        |      
       
 
The iteration is repeated until likelihood improvement falls below a pre-specified value or the 
iteration reaches a maximum number. 
In the next section, I explain how a finite mixture regression model was used to separate 
subjects from simulated samples. The “Flexmix” package (Leisch, 2004) designed for R software 
was used to apply the finite mixture regression model. 
 
A SIMULATION STUDY 
The purpose of the simulation is to assess the ability of the finite mixture model to 
separate subjects with different weighting functions. The proposed theoretical model for 
measuring a subject’s attitude weighting function is shown below: 
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where WTP is the willingness to pay, V is the product value, p’ is seller review valence, and N is 
seller review volume. This model can be fitted regularly as a polynomial regression. However, 
only three parameters, a, b, and c, need to be estimated; therefore, I used a linear instead of a 
polynomial regression, as shown in the equation below. 
                        
         
 
     
          
 
 
As in Essay Two, the shape of the weighting function is determined by the estimations of 




In this section, I discuss the data used for the simulation. 
Data generation. I used the following steps to generate data for each variable: 
Review valence p’: a random variable that follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 
Review number N: a random variable that follows a uniform distribution between 1 and 
2,000 
Product value V: $800.00 
Error ε: a random variable that follows a standard normal distribution 
Sample size. In Essay Two, I proposed that there are five types of weighting functions. 
For this simulation, I generated 500 observations for each group; hence the total sample size of 
the simulated data is 2500.  
Parameters. The parameters for each group are shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Simulated Parameters 
Group Shape 
Parameters 
c a b 
1 Concave 0 20 0 
2  Convex 0 20 0 
3  Linear 0 0 0 
4  S-Shaped* 0 20 40 
5  Reversely S-Shaped* 0 20 40 




I created five subsets of the simulated data. Subset 1 contained subjects from group 3; 
subset 2 contained subjects from groups 2 and 3; subset 3 contained subjects from groups 1, 2, 
and 3; subset 4 contained subjects from groups 1, 2, 3, and 4; and the last subset, 5, contained all 
of the subjects in the simulated data. The composition of each subset is shown in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 Summary of Subsets of Simulated Data 
Subset Groups included in the data Size 
1 Group 3 500 
2 Group 3, Group 2 1000 
3 Group 3, Group 2, Group 1 1500 
4 Group 3, Group 2, Group 1, Group 4 2000 
5 Group 3, Group 2, Group 1, Group 4, Group 5 2500 
 
A finite mixture regression model was applied to each subset to estimate the parameters 
for that subset. 
 
Results 
The finite mixture regression model generated multiple models with different numbers of 
components. Under the maximum likelihood framework, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
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(Akaike, 1974) can be used to choose the best model. As shown below, AIC accounts for both 
likelihood and model complexity.  
              
where L is the likelihood function of the model and d is the number of parameters in the model. 
For each subset, the model with the minimum AIC value was selected. For the first four 
subsets, the finite mixture regression model successfully identified the number of groups 
embedded in the data. For subset 5, the finite mixture regression model identified six groups 
instead of five; the extra group, however, had a very small size of 8 observations. See Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Summary of Selected Models from Each Subset 
Subset Data Component Log Likelihood d.f. AIC 
1 G3 1 713.5234 4 1435.047 
2 G3, G2 2 1758.183 9 3534.366 
3 G3, G2, G1 3 3031.585 14 6091.170 
4 G3, G2, G1,G4 4 4106.782 19 8251.564 
5 G3, G2, G1,G4, G5 6 5210.928 24 10469.860 
 
Parameter estimation. For each subset, the parameters estimated for each group are 
shown in Table 3.5. The finite mixture regression model successfully identified all of the groups, 
and for each group, the estimates were very close to the true value of the parameters. For subset 
5, the finite mixture regression model generated6 components; the extra component, component 
4, belonged to group 4. Furthermore, the estimates of component 4 were different from the true 
parameters of group 4. Again, the extra component only had 8 observations, and this result 
probably was due to random errors. 
Hit ratio. The hit ratio for each subset is shown below. When the data contained only one 
group, the finite mixture regression model correctly identified the group. As one group at a time 




Table 3.5 Parameter Estimations for Simulated Data 
Data Component Size Group  Coefficient Std. Error Z Value P 
G3 1 500 G3 
Xa 0.075 0.079 0.954 0.340 
Xb 0.151 0.155 0.975 0.329 
G3, G2 
1 474 G3 
Xa 0.085 0.076 1.110 0.267 
Xb 0.168 0.150 1.121 0.263 
2 526 G2 
Xa 19.978 0.068 294.661 0.000 
Xb 0.020 0.186 0.110 0.912 
G3, 
G2, G1 
1 493 G1 
Xa 19.960 0.077 259.538 0.000 
Xb 0.112 0.150 0.744 0.457 
2 522 G2 
Xa 19.978 0.067 296.825 0.000 
Xb 0.020 0.184 0.106 0.915 
3 485 G3 
Xa 0.079 0.071 1.120 0.263 




1 483 G4 
Xa 19.988 0.066 301.679 0.000 
Xb 39.987 0.129 311.025 0.000 
2 568 G2 
Xa 19.980 0.066 300.862 0.000 
Xb 0.027 0.182 0.148 0.882 
3 454 G3 
Xa 0.070 0.072 0.967 0.333 
Xb 0.150 0.142 1.055 0.291 
4 495 G1 
Xa 19.964 0.077 260.096 0.000 





1 554 G1 
Xa 19.959 0.078 257.394 0.000 
Xb 0.115 0.151 0.759 0.448 
2 378 G5 
Xa 19.928 0.126 157.718 0.000 
Xb 39.838 0.247 161.320 0.000 
3 245 G3 
Xa 0.062 0.084 0.728 0.466 
Xb 0.134 0.164 0.816 0.414 
4 8 G4 
Xa 0.507 0.092 5.505 0.000 
Xb 0.547 0.148 3.691 0.000 
5 656 G2 
Xa 19.977 0.068 294.868 0.000 
Xb 0.015 0.186 0.080 0.936 
6 659 G4 
Xa 19.988 0.064 310.890 0.000 
Xb 39.988 0.123 324.673 0.000 
 
However, in comparison with the hit ratio of random assignment of subjects to groups, 
the advantage of the finite mixture regression model became more salient as the number of 
groups increased. When the data included all five groups, the hit ratio of the finite mixture 
regression model was almost three times that of the hit ratio of random assignment. 
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Table 3.6 Hit Ratios of Selected Models  
Data Group Component Hit Ratio 
G3 
 G1 G2 G3 G 4 G5  
G1       
G2       
G3   500   100% 
G4       
G5       
Overall      100% 
G3, G2 
 G1 G2 G3 G 4 G5  
G1       
G2  441 59   88.20% 
G3  85 415   83.00% 
G4       
G 5       
Overall      85.60% 
G3,G2,G1 
 G1 G2 G3 G 4 G5  
G1 416 15 69   83.20% 
G2 14 432 54   86.40% 
G3 63 75 362   72.40% 
G4       
G5       
Overall      80.67% 
G3,G2,G1,G4 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5  
G1 388 16 48 48  77.60% 
G2 8 406 29 57  81.20% 
G3 46 66 267 121  53.40% 
G4 53 80 110 257  51.40% 
G5       
Overall      65.90% 
G3,G1,G2,G4,G5 
 G1 G2 G3 G 4 G5  
G1 371 24 10 61 34 74.20% 
G2 7 395 7 71 20 79.00% 
G3 43 63 154 154 86 30.80% 
G4 55 84 42 292 27 58.40% 
G5 78 90 32 89 211 42.20% 




Table 3.7 Comparison of Finite Mixture Regression Model and Random Assignment 
Data 
Hit Ratio of 
Finite Mixture Regression Model 
Hit Ratio of 
Random Assignment 
G3 100.00% 100.00% 
G3, G2 85.60% 50.00% 
G3, G2, G1 80.67% 33.33% 
G3, G2, G1, G4 65.90% 25.00% 
G3, G2, G1, G4, G5 56.92% 20.00% 
 
Discussion 
The simulation study shows that the finite mixture regression model was very effective at 
separating subjects into different groups and identifying the true parameters of each group. As 
the number of underlying groups increased, the method became even more superior. 
At the same time, I acknowledge the challenges of using a finite mixture regression 
model in this particular case. First, the regression model is complex, as shown by the hit ratio, 
which dropped dramatically as the model’s complexity increased. When a quadratic term was 
introduced to the model by adding the convex group (G2) to the linear group (G3), the hit ratio 
dropped about 15%, from 100% to 85.6%. Also, when a cubic term was introduced to the model 
by adding the S-shaped group (G4), again, the hit ratio dropped about 15%, from 80.67% to 
65.9%. However, if the model already contained a quadratic or cubic term, adding another term 
of the same power (G1 and G5) led to much smaller decreases in hit ratio. Second, for my 
simulation data, I generated review valences based on a uniform distribution; however, as 
discussed in the previous section, samples drawn from eBay usually have high review valences. 
Sellers who have low review valences either exit the market or change their IDs and rebuild their 
review profile (Lin et al., 2006; Abbasi et al., 2008). Such a skewed distribution of review 




AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
eBay’s Review System 
eBay’s rating system has gone through several changes since it was introduced. At the 
time the data for this study was collected, eBay’s review system worked in the following way: A 
buyer could submit feedback to a seller after each transaction; the feedback could be positive, 
neutral, or negative. eBay then provided a statistical summary for each member. The “Feedback 
Score” equaled the number of positive minus the number of negative reviews. The “Positive 
Feedback Percentage” was the number of positive reviews divided by the sum of positive and 
negative reviews a member had received in the last 12 months. Both numbers were displayed by 
the member’s login ID, so when a buyer reviewed the auction, she could see the statistics on the 
same page as the product information. If she clicked the link to visit the seller’s profile page, she 
could view additional information, including the number of positive, neutral, and negative 
reviews that the seller had received in the past 1, 6, and 12 months; the ratings of the seller for 
criteria such as communication and shipping time; and detailed comments left by previous 
customers along with the product they purchased from this seller. 
 
Data Collection 
I collected transaction data for anew PlayStation 2 sold on eBay between September and 
November in 2009. The PlayStation 2 was sold for $299 dollars, and the offline list price did not 
change during the period of data collection. For each auction, I collected the description of the 
product; auction information such as shipping policy, return policy, payment policy, etc.; bidding 
history; and seller profile. Originally, 678 observations were collected; however, some were 
removed from the data for various reasons. First, some auctions did not result in sales, which led 
to invalid transactions. Second, some sellers had reviews that were 100% positive, because the 
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positive percentage was calculated based on reviews left within a year. Relying on reviews 
submitted within a year to calculate the positive percentage significantly increased the proportion 
of sellers with 100% positive responses. To reduce this bias, I removed the observation if a 
seller’s positive percentage was 100% but her most recent 200 reviews were not uniformly 
positive. Third, some sellers had 100% positive reviews, but had never sold an item on eBay 
before, accumulating all of their positive reviews from previous purchases on eBay. Research 
has shown that reviews for a seller’s purchase behavior do not influence purchase price (Zhang, 
2006); hence I removed the observation if a seller had never sold a product on eBay prior to the 




Willingness to pay. Similar to the approach used by Sun and Liu (2010), the winning bid 
plus the shipping cost were totaled to measure a buyer’s willingness to pay for the product. It is 
reasonable to consider shipping cost when measuring willingness to pay, because when an eBay 
consumer wins an auction, the amount paid will include the bid price and the shipping cost 
charged by the seller. Previous research has shown that consumers will consider shipping cost 
when they participate in auctions and auctions with higher shipping costs usually result in lower 
final bidding prices (Bockstedt and Goh, 2011). 
Review volume N. eBay provided a feedback score for each member, which was the 
difference between the number of positive and negative reviews, instead of the total number of 
reviews. As discussed above, the feedback score contains information about the review volume 
and the review valence, which is insufficient for explaining the relationship between reviews and 
price premium. To consider review valence and review volume separately, and to avoid 
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confounding the two constructs, I measured review volume by estimating the total number of 
reviews a seller had. Using a formula based on feedback score and positive review percentage, I 
calculated the number of reviews as shown below: 
                                      
         
     
    
                                       
                                                           
Review valence p’. Review valence is equivalent to the percentage of positive reviews, 
which was provided by eBay. 
Control variables. Variables that also may influence willingness to pay were included in 
the model as control variables. Some items were featured, or displayed at the top of search 
results, and some items had special features, such as a warranty. Specialty items may influence 
the final price because consumers may perceive them as more valuable or less risky than the 
regular items. Zhou et al. (2009) found that offering a full warranty for the product significantly 
increases the auction price, and Bockstedt and Goh (2011) found that featured items are sold at a 
higher price than non-featured items. Therefore, I included a dummy variable, “Specialty,” 
which indicated whether the auction item was listed as a featured item or had special features: 0 
denoted a regular item and 1 denoted a specialty item. 
Acceptance of returned products reduces the risk associated with a purchase; hence, 
consumers may pay less for a product if it's non-returnable. I used a dummy variable, “Return,” 
to indicate the return policy of a seller, with 0 denoting that returns were accepted or that 
information was not provided, and 1 denoting that the seller did not accept returns. 
Suter and Hardesty (2005) found that the number of bidders increases as the starting bid 
set by the seller increases, and as a result, seller's earnings increase. Kamins et al. (2004), who 
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proposed the opposite influence of the starting bid on final price, found that the number of 
bidders consistently has a positive influence on final bidding price, fully mediating the 
relationship between the starting bid and the final price. As previous research has shown that the 
number of bidders in fluencies the final price, I included a variable, “Bidders,” to account for this 
effect. 
It also has been shown that auctions ending during peak time generally have higher 
closing prices, and that consumers pay more attention to auctions during its closing period 
regardless of the length or closing day of the auction (Melnik and Alm, 2002).Based on that 
research, I used a dummy variable, “Hour,” to indicate the peak period of transactions. A value 
of0 indicated that the auction ended sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. central standard 
time (CST), and that during this period, there were on average 5.3transactionsper hour. A value 
of 1 indicated that the auction ended between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. CST, and that there were 
on average 32.1 transactions per hour. 
Previous studies also have considered the impact of time on product value (Park et al., 
2012).The data were collected throughout the three months, and even though the list price of the 
product did not change during this period, the perceived value of the product could, especially as 
the holiday season approached. Similar to the approach taken by Wu and Ayala (2012), I used 
two dummy variables to account for the monthly fluctuation of the perceived value of the 
product due to external market conditions. One dummy variable indicated auctions that ended in 
October, and the other indicated auctions that ended in November. 




Table 3.8 Summary of Empirical Data Variables 
Variable Measure 
WTP Final Bid plus Shipping Fee charged by the seller 
N Review Volume 
p’ Review Valence 
Specialty 
Whether the item was listed as a featured item on eBay: 
0 means no and 1 means yes  
Return 
Seller’s return policy:0 means either accepts returns or does not provide 
information about return policy and 1 means does not accept return 
Bidders The number of bidders who bid in the auction 
Hour 
0: low transaction period from 23:00 to 8:59 CST 
1: high transaction period from 9:00 to 22:59 CST 
Month10 0: auction did not end in October; 1: auction ended in October 
Month11 0: auction did not end in November; 1: auction ended in November 
 
 
Table 3.9 Empirical Data Description  
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
WTP 302.74 19.16 
N 825.45 1551.6 
p’ 0.9916 0.0163 
Bidders 10 4.45 
 Number of 0 Number of 1 
Specialty 482 47 
Return 306 223 
Hour 48 481 
Month10 343 186 




I used a finite mixture regression model to segment 529 observations into different 
groups,and linear regression models for the observations in each group to test the hypothesis 
with respect to that group. The models for classifying observations and testing hypotheses are 
shown below. 
Classification model. To classify observations, I used the model proposed in Essay Two, 
with the addition of the control variables. 
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where                ,                          , 
                             , and i: i
th
observation 
Hypothesis testing model. To test the hypothesis, I used a linear-log function of reviews 
plus the control variables.
2
As in Essay Two,  a linear-log function, was used to instead of a linear 
function, can capture this diminished return of reputation. 
                                                                        





 group, k: below or above cross-over point 
 
Aggregate Analysis Results  
I ran the hypothesis model with all 529 observations, assuming that there is no difference 
among consumers in terms of preference towards review volume. Table 3.10 presents the results 
of the analysis at the aggregate level. 
Table 3.10 Aggregate Analysis Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t value P value 
Review Valence p’ 0.728 0.146 4.979 0.000 
Review Volume N 0.005 0.001 3.623 0.000 
 
At the aggregate level, both review valence and review volume had significant positive 







To identify the optimal model, I initially set the pre-specified number of componentsto1, 
and then increased it to 10one setting at a time. The largest number of components the finite 
mixture regression model identified was8. The best component models are shown in Table 3.11. 
I selected the model with the smallest AIC; hence, the 7-component model was selected based on 
the classification model. 
Table 3.11 Model Selection for Empirical Data 
Model # of Components Log likelihood d.f. AIC 
1 1 2255.931 10 4531.863 
2 2 2201.223 21 4444.446 
3 3 2173.237 32 4410.475 
4 4 2152.760 43 4391.519 
5 5 2137.532 54 4383.064 
6 6 2115.566 65 4361.132 
7 7 2098.094 76 4348.188 
8 8 2089.303 87 4352.607 
 
The 7-component model identified 3 out of 5 groups: 20.6% of the consumers belonged 
to the linear group, 38.2% were S-shaped, and 41.2% were reversely S-shaped. Consistent with 
the literature and experimental study in Essay Two, the reversely S-shaped group was the largest. 
For the S-shaped group, all observations were located above the cross-over point, so within the 
range of the sample, the S-shaped group can be considered a convex group. Detailed information 
for the 7-component model is shown in Table 3.12. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Results  




Table 3.12 7-Component Model Parameter Estimations 
Component Size Group  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
Z Value P 
Cross-over 
Point 
1 54 G3 
Xa 6225.269 5053.500 1.232 0.218 
NA 
Xb 6450.339 5293.242 1.219 0.223 
2 55 G3 
Xa 610.529 2268.808 0.269 0.788 
NA 
Xb 661.048 2397.805 0.276 0.783 
3 112 G5 
Xa 1296.158 275.667 4.702 0.000 
0.9561 
Xb 1355.640 293.296 4.622 0.000 
4 59 G5 
Xa 2685.200 93.154 28.826 0.000 
0.9411 
Xb 2853.300 99.621 28.641 0.000 
5 70 G4 
Xa 636.825 201.779 3.156 0.002 
0.8912 
Xb 714.567 214.832 3.326 0.001 
6 132 G4 
Xa 1086.973 305.676 3.556 0.000 
0.8830 
Xb 1231.051 327.791 3.756 0.000 
7 47 G5 
Xa 1180.900 95.125 12.414 0.000 
0.9375 
Xb 1259.600 100.720 12.506 0.000 
 
The impact of review valence p’. The results showed that, in general, review valence p’ 
had a significant positive impact on consumers’ willingness to pay. However, in a result 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, review valence had no impact on willingness to pay for the 
linear weighting group, and had a negative influence for the reversely S-shaped weighting group 
when it was below the cross-over point. For the rest of the consumers, as held by the hypotheses, 
review valence showed a positive influence on willingness to pay. With respect to the linear 
shaped weighting group, out of 109 observations, 53 had a 100% review valence. Therefore, 
even though the impact of review valence was insignificant, the positive coefficient was still a 
strong sign of its positive impact on willingness to pay. 
The impact of review volume N. As expected, the impact of review volume on 
willingness to pay varied among groups. Consistent with the hypotheses, review volume had no 
impact on willingness to pay for the linear shaped weighting group. For the S-shaped weighting 
group, review volume showed a negative influence on willingness to pay when review valence 
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was above the cross-over point, although such an effect was statistically insignificant. For the 
reversely S-shaped weighting group, review volume had a negative impact on willingness to pay 
when the valence was below the cross-over point, but a positive impact when it was above. Table 
3.13 presents the results of the hypothesis testing. 
Table 3.13 Hypothesis Testing Result Summary 




G3 0.156 0.410 0.380 0.705 RD* 
G4 
Above Cross-over Point 
0.244 0.120 2.031 0.044 S 
G5 
Below Cross-over Point 
1.631 0.447 3.652 0.022 NS 
G5 
Above Cross-over Point 




G3 0.004 0.005 0.821 0.414 S 
G4 
Above Cross-over Point 
0.001 0.001 1.015 0.311 RD 
G5 
Below Cross-over Point 
0.039 0.008 5.002 0.007 S 
G5 
Above Cross-over Point 
0.006 0.001 4.364 0.000 S 
* RD: Estimate had same sign as proposed by hypothesis, but effect was not significant. 
S: Hypothesis was supported at significant level of 0.05. 




Both the experimental and empirical studies confirmed that consumer heterogeneity 
exists and influences the way that consumers use seller review information in their purchase 
decisions. Although the empirical study only identified3 out of the 5 groups originally proposed, 
it showed that consumers can be very different in their preferences towards review volume: some 
consumers simply do not care much about review volume, some consumers have relatively stable 
preferences towards review volume, and some consumers will change their preferences towards 
review volume based on review valence. On the aggregate level, my empirical data showed that 
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review volume has a positive effect on consumers’ willingness to pay, because the majority of 
the observations fell in the reversely S-shaped group and review valence was above the cross-
over point. I expect that the relationship between review volume and consumers’ willingness to 
pay will change if the sample’s composition changes. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
inconsistent observations of the influence of review volume on an aggregate level when the 
conclusions are drawn from different samples. 
The limitation of the current empirical study is that the data collection period was not 
long enough to identify sellers with low review valences, because these sellers may eventually be 
eliminated by the market. As a result, the distribution of review valence was negatively skewed, 
and it is hard to identify observations below the cross-over points for the S-shaped and reversely 
S-shaped groups. Future research can improve the validity of the framework by adopting a larger 
and more representative set of data.  
My research provides a descriptive framework that shows that consumers have different 
preferences towards review volume and, furthermore, that such differences can be categorized by 
consumers’ weighting functions. My studies establish correlation rather than a causal 
relationship between weighting function and the impact of review volume on willingness to pay. 
Future studies can establish a causal relationship by developing independent measurements of 
weighting functions. 
Finally, the current framework was developed under the binary review format; thus it 
only considers review volume and valence. Future research can extend the framework to include 
a continuous review format, such as Amazon.com’s, and incorporate the influence of review 






1. Formulas for finite mixture models are consistent with those shown in Leish (2004).  
 
2. For the observations in group 5 that were below the cross-over point, covariant variables 
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